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Abstract 
 
The forward premium anomaly, i.e., the empirical evidence that exchange rate changes are 
negatively related to interest rate differentials, is one of the most robust puzzles in financial 
economics. We add to this literature by recasting the underlying parity relation in terms of cross-
country differences between forward interest rates rather than spot interest rates. The differences 
using spot and maturity-matched forward rates are dramatic. As the maturity of the forward 
interest rate differential increases, the anomalous sign on the coefficient in the traditional 
specification is reversed, and the explanatory power increases. We present a simple model of 
interest rates, inflation, and exchange rates that explains this novel empirical evidence. The 
model is based on interest rate distortions due to Taylor rules and exchange rate determination 
involving not just purchasing power parity, but also effects due to real rate differentials and 
subsequent reversion of the exchange rate to fundamentals. We develop and test additional 
implications of this model. A key finding is that the effect of current interest rate differentials on 
exchange rates can be decomposed into two offsetting components, which, if used separately, 
greatly increase the explanatory power of regression models for exchange rates. 
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I. Introduction 
Well over one hundred papers document, in some form or another, the forward premium anomaly—
namely, that future exchange rate changes do not move one-for-one with interest rate differentials across 
countries. In fact, they tend to move in the opposite direction (e.g., see Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996) 
for survey evidence). This anomaly has led to a plethora of papers over the last two decades that develop 
possible explanations with only limited success. It is reasonable to conclude that the forward premium 
anomaly is one of the more robust puzzles in financial economics.  Parallel to work on the forward 
premium puzzle, another literature has developed, starting with Meese and Rogoff (1983), documenting 
an equally startling puzzle: exchange rates do not seem to be related to fundamentals.1 The random walk 
model has proven almost unbeatable, even against models with a variety of finance and macro variables.  
This paper looks at the forward premium anomaly, and the fundamental determinants of exchange 
rates, in a novel way by recasting the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) relation in terms of future 
exchange rate movements against forward interest rate differentials across countries. The motivation for 
our work derives from recent evidence that exchange rates “behave” more in line with theory at longer 
horizons. Our approach allows us to examine the forward premium anomaly at longer horizons without 
being subject to the severe econometric problems that beset existing empirical studies.2 We study three 
currencies, the U.S. dollar, the British pound, and the German mark/Euro, over the 1976-2010 sample 
period. In stark contrast to current research on uncovered interest rate parity, past forward interest rate 
differentials have strong forecasting power for exchange rates. R2s at some horizons exceed 10% for 
annual exchange rate changes relative to about 2% for the traditional specification. Moreover, the 
direction of these forecasts coincides with the theoretical implications of UIP. 
We present a simple model of interest rates, inflation, and exchange rates that fits the contrasting 
empirical evidence on UIP when using forward, rather than spot, interest rate differentials. Though the 
model is reduced-form in nature, it is developed to capture existing stylized facts. Exchange rates are 
determined by three components: (i) purchasing power parity (PPP), (ii) real rate differentials arising 
from interest rate distortions due to the application of Taylor rules, and (iii) a positive probability that the 
currency will revert to PPP. The model can jointly explain why uncovered interest rate parity fails, why it 
appears to work better using lagged forward interest rate differentials, and why the explanatory power for 
exchange rates increases with the horizon, i.e., more lagged and stale information. The key insight is that, 
                                                 
1 Meese and Rogoff (1983) find that the literature’s typical structural models of exchange rates cannot outperform a 
naïve random walk model  even when one uses ex-post values of the variables of interest such as money supply, real 
income, inflation and interest rates. These findings are revisited and confirmed by Cheung, Chinn, and Garcia 
Pascual (2003) using updated data. For a theoretical analysis of this issue, see Engel and West (2005). 
2 See, e.g., Alexius (2001), Bekaert, Wei, and Xing (2007), Clarida, Sarno, Taylor, and Valente (2003), Kilian and 
Taylor (2003), and Chinn and Meredith (2004, 2005). 
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while real rate differentials do lead to PPP violations and the rejection of UIP, the build-up of these 
violations generally gets reversed, which we model as a “crash” back to PPP. 
Two additional implications of this model are developed and tested. First, a key theoretical 
finding of our model is that current interest rate differentials can be decomposed into two main offsetting 
components, which, if used separately, increase the explanatory power for exchange rates. This 
implication is tested and confirmed in the data. For example, by decomposing current interest rate 
differentials into forecasts, under the expectations hypothesis, based on prior forward interest rate 
differentials and corresponding forecast errors, the R2s jump from 2% for the UIP regressions to between 
14% and 16% for the USD/GBP exchange rate and between 6% and 13% for the US/DEM rate. Most 
important, the coefficients on the two components of the interest rate differential are of opposite signs. 
The intuition is that the forward interest rate differential has better information about the magnitude of the 
deviation from PPP and thus the impact of a currency crash than does the current interest rate differential. 
The forecast error in contrast better captures the current real rate differential and the associated deviations 
from PPP in exchange rates. 
A second implication of the model is that the change in exchange rates is a function of two key 
state variables—the interest rate differential and the magnitude of the deviation of the current exchange 
rate from that implied by PPP. These two variables identify the same decomposition discussed above, 
with the interest rate differential capturing violations of UIP associated with real rate distortions and the 
deviation from PPP capturing the reversal of this effect in the longer term as exchange rates revert to 
fundamentals. The deviation of the exchange rate from PPP is not directly observable, but we can 
calculate the real exchange rate, which, up to a constant, captures the same information in the context of 
our model. Thus, we regress annual exchange rate changes on the interest rate differential and the real 
exchange rate. The results are striking and consistent with the theory. Controlling for the real exchange 
rate, the coefficient on the interest rate differential becomes more negative and is identified more 
precisely. Moreover, together the variables generate R2s of approximately 25% for both currencies.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the data and presents new empirical 
evidence on the exchange rate parity relation in terms of forward interest rate differentials.  In Section III, 
we present our reduced form model of exchange rates, which can explain this new evidence. Of particular 
importance, we derive two new testable implications of the model: (1) a decomposition of predictable 
exchange rate changes generated by factoring interest rate differentials into their expected component, 
based on lagged forward interest rate differentials, and the associated innovation and (2) a related 
decomposition that uses interest rate differentials and deviations of exchange rates from PPP. In Section 
IV, we provide additional empirical evidence in support of the model in the context of these two new 
results. Section V concludes. 
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II. Uncovered Interest Rate Parity at Short and Long Horizons 
A. Data 
We use monthly data from Datastream on exchange rates, inflation rates, and interest rates for the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany from January 1976 to August 2010, a total of 416 months. Our 
sample is limited to these three countries due to the necessity of having term structure data at annual 
maturities out to five years. Data for exchange rates (the Euro was substituted for the Deutschmark in the 
latter part of the sample) and CPI levels are available for the full period. Data for the term structure of 
zero-coupon interest rates are derived from LIBOR data (with maturities of six and twelve months) and 
swap rates (two-, three-, four-, and five-year semi-annual swap rates).3 Since swap data only become 
available in the late 1980s, we augment our zero curve data with data from Philippe Jorion. Jorion and 
Mishkin (1991) collect and derive data for zero coupon bonds from one month to five years for the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany from August 1973 to December 1988.4 Swap and LIBOR data 
is preferred to typical government bond data because the quotes are more liquid and less prone to missing 
data, supply and demand effects, and tax-related biases. To the extent that there is a swap spread (i.e., the 
difference between the swap and government bond rates) embedded in the data, its effect is diminished by 
using interest rate differentials across countries in our analysis. 
Using the exchange rate and CPI data described above, we compute annual changes in log 
exchanges rates with the U.S. dollar as the base currency, i.e., we examine changes in the USD/GBP and 
USD/DEM rates, and annual log changes in the CPI indexes, i.e., the inflation rates for the three 
countries. We also combine these series to construct real exchange rates for both country pairs. Given the 
monthly frequency of the underlying data, adjacent annual changes have an 11-month overlap. Using the 
zero curve data, we compute continuously compounded one-year spot interest rates and one-year forward 
interest rates for each country from years 1 to 2, 2 to 3, 3 to 4, and 4 to 5. Our analysis matches the j to 
j+1 year forward interest rate at time t-j with the subsequent exchange rate change from time t to time 
t+1.5 To ensure that we use exactly the same exchange rate series for all regressions, we eliminate the 
first four years of the exchange rate data, truncating the interest rate series accordingly. The final dataset 
                                                 
3 Cubic spline functions were fitted each month for each country to create a zero curve for maturities of 6, 12, 18, 
…, 60 months. Our spline function fits the available data exactly, namely LIBOR rates for the 6-month and 12-
month maturities, and semi-annual swap rates for maturities of 24 months, 36 months, 48 months, and 60 months. 
Therefore, the only maturities we need to spline are 18 months, 30 months, 42 months and 54 months. We maximize 
the smoothness of the spline function over these unknowns by minimizing the sum of squared deviations.     
4 We thank Philippe Jorion for graciously providing us with the data. 
5 Throughout the paper we use annual exchange rate changes and annual interest rates and forward rates; thus, for 
ease of exposition, all periods are denoted in years. However, as noted above, these annual quantities are calculated 
on a monthly overlapping basis to maximize the information content of the empirical analysis. 
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consists of annual exchange rate changes, with the first observation corresponding to calendar year 1980 
and the last to the period September 2009 to August 2010 (357 observations sampled monthly), spot 
interest rates from 1/1980-9/2009, and forward interest rates over the periods 1/1979–9/2008, 1/1978–
9/2007, 1/1977–9/2006, and 1/1976–9/2005 for horizons j = 1,…,4, respectively (all with 357 
observations). Table 1, Panels A and B contain descriptive statistics for these variables.  
 
B. Existing Evidence 
The expectations hypothesis for exchange rates (forward parity) is commonly written as 
,jtjtt fsE        (1) 
where jts   is the log of the spot price of foreign currency at time t+j, and
j
tf  is the log of the j-year 
forward exchange rate at time t. Assuming no arbitrage and covered interest rate parity (i.e.,
)( *,, jtjtt
j
t iijsf  , where it,j is the domestic, j-year, continuously compounded (log), annualized 
interest rate at time t and the superscript * denotes the corresponding foreign interest rate), the expected 
change in the exchange rate equals the interest rate differential. Thus, one standard way of testing 
equation (1) for annual changes in exchange rates is to estimate the regression  
,)( 1,
*
1,1,1, ttttt iis          (2) 
where tttt sss   11, . Under uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), α and β should be 0 and 1, 
respectively. That is, high interest rate currencies should depreciate and low interest rate currencies 
should appreciate in proportion to the interest rate differential across the countries. Intuitively, expected 
(real) returns on bonds in the two countries should be equal. This hypothesis has been resoundingly 
rejected, and, most alarming, β tends to be negative, i.e., exchange rates move in the opposite direction to 
that implied by the theory.6 In the context of equation (1), the forward premium, jtjt fs  , has a 
systematic bias and is predictable.7 
One possible explanation for these findings is the existence of a risk premium in exchange rates. 
However, in order for this omitted variable in the regression in equation (2) to cause the coefficient β to 
change signs, this risk premium must exhibit significant time-variation and be negatively correlated with 
the interest rate differential, as noted in Fama (1984a). While such a risk premium could explain the 
                                                 
6 This negative relation is the basis for the so called “carry trade” in which investors borrow in the low interest rate 
currency and invest in the high interest rate currency. Under UIP this interest rate differential would be expected to 
be offset by exchange rate movements, but the reversal of the UIP relation in the data makes this trade apparently 
profitable. 
7 See, e.g., Engel (1996) and Lewis (1995) for surveys of this literature. Interestingly, some evidence suggests that 
the forward premium anomaly may be confined to developed economies and may be asymmetric or state dependent 
even in those economies (Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), Wu and Zhang (1996)). 
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results from a statistical perspective, from an economic standpoint the key challenge is to identify for 
what risk this premium is providing compensation. So far, attempts to match the implied risk premium to 
economic risks have proven unsuccessful.8 
A recent exception to the standard forward premium anomaly results can be found in Chinn and 
Meredith (2004, 2005). They run regression equation (2) over long horizons, i.e., jtts  , on )( *1,1, tt iij  , 
where j varies from 4 to 10 years. Using the last 20 years of data, and across many exchange rates, the 
point estimates of β tend to be positive, and are statistically indistinguishable from 1. However, the 
statistical properties of the regressions are questionable as there are only two to five non-overlapping 
observations in the data. The problems with such regressions are well known. Richardson and Stock 
(1989) and Valkanov (2003) show that the estimators and test statistics are inconsistent, with non-normal 
limiting distributions (see also Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2008)). The intuition is that the 
frequent sampling of large partial sums of the data (i.e., in this case, four- to ten-year exchange rate 
movements) generates a series that takes on the properties of a nonstationary series, and standard central 
limit theorems no longer apply.   
One way to avoid this problem is to use an alternative methodology based on a specified vector 
autoregression (VAR), which exploits short-run dynamics to infer long-range forecasts (see, e.g.,  
Hodrick (1992), and, more recently in the context of exchange rates and the term structure, Bekaert, Wei, 
and Xing (2007)). In fact, the effectively small sample size issue motivates Bekaert, Wei, and Xing 
(2007) to look at the long-horizon properties of uncovered interest rate parity using VARs. However, 
there are two problems with this approach in the context of equation (2). First, as is well known from the 
predictability literature, the benefits underlying the VAR methodology quickly erode if the predictor 
variables are highly persistent (Boudoukh and Richardson (1994)). As has been documented elsewhere, 
and as is also apparent in Table 1, Panel A, the interest rate differentials have a high degree of serial 
correlation. Second, and more important, the VAR specification imposes a particular model on the system 
at hand. If that model is incorrect, then it is unclear how to interpret long-range forecasts. Consider, for 
example, the findings in Fama (1984b) and Fama and Bliss (1987), which show that the expectations 
hypothesis for interest rates behaves quite differently at short and long horizons. Ignoring this aspect of 
the expectations hypothesis in specifying the short-run VAR is problematic. In contrast, in this paper, we 
argue that it is actually the divergence between short and long horizons that is most interesting. 
As a first pass at the short-horizon version of equation (2), Table 1, Panel C reports estimates 
from regressions of annual exchange rate changes on interest rate differentials on a monthly overlapping 
basis. The β coefficients (t-statistics for β = 1) are –0.82 (2.07) and –0.72 (2.39) for the USD/GBP and 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Bekaert (1996), Mark and Wu (1998) and Graveline (2006). 
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USD/DEM, respectively, confirming the well-known negative relation between exchange rates and 
interest rate differentials. While the estimates are fairly noisy, tests of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients equal 1 can be resoundingly rejected.  
The low R2s in the regressions are also notable, and this feature is both disappointing and 
puzzling. The key fundamentals underlying expected exchange rate movements are interest rate 
differentials between countries. These interest rate differentials, in theory, represent expected inflation 
rate differentials. Since inflation is fairly predictable (see, e.g., Fama and Gibbons (1984)), and inflation 
differentials are a fundamental driver of exchange rates via purchasing power parity, one would have 
expected the model to explain a much larger degree of the variation. 
 
C. Information about Exchange Rate Changes in Long-Maturity Forward Rates  
 In this subsection, we present a novel way to analyze the long-horizon properties of the forward premium 
anomaly, and the fundamental determinants of exchange rates, by recasting the parity relation in terms of 
future exchange rate movements against forward interest rate differentials across countries. The benefit of 
such an approach is that it avoids many of the econometric issues described above. 
Specifically, we can also use equation (1) to define expected changes in future exchange rates as 
the difference between two forward exchange rates. That is, 
j
t
k
tktjtt ffsE   ][ , ,      (3) 
where k > j. Under the expectations hypothesis of exchange rates, the period t expected depreciation from 
t+j to t+k equals the difference in the corresponding forward exchange rates at time t. Under covered 
interest rate parity, we can replace the forward exchange rates in equation (3) with the interest rate 
differentials between the two countries, i.e., 
).()(][ *,,
*
,,, jtjtktktktjtt iijiiksE        (4) 
Rearranging the interest rate differential terms in equation (4), and using the definition of forward interest 
rates, we get 
))((
)()(][
*,,
*
,
*
,,,,
kj
t
kj
t
jtktjtktktjtt
ififjk
ijikijiksE

 
 ,    (5) 
where kjtif
, and 
*,kj
tif  are the continuously compounded, annualized, forward interest rates at time t from 
t+j to t+k for domestic and foreign currencies, respectively. Equation (5) is the basis for the empirical 
analysis to follow. It says that the expected depreciation in future exchange rates is equal what we call the 
forward interest rate differential. 
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Equation (5) extends the classical approach to characterizing and testing the expectations 
hypothesis presented in equations (1) and (2). It implies a more general specification of the expectation 
hypothesis, 
.)( 1,
*1,1,
1, 



  jjtjj jtjj jttt ififs      (6) 
Under the expectations hypothesis of exchange rates, the annual exchange rate change from t to t+1 
should move one-for-one with the forward interest rate differential from j to j+1 that was set at time t–j. 
That is, α and β should equal 0 and 1 respectively. Equation (2) is a special case of equation (6) for j = 0. 
Equation (6) exploits the information in the entire forward curve. However, the error term is now 
a j-step ahead forecast, and is serially correlated up to j observations. Therefore, one of the difficulties in 
studying multi-step ahead forecast regressions like those specified in equation (6) is the availability of 
data. While sophisticated econometrics have somewhat alleviated the problem (Hansen and Hodrick 
(1980) and Hansen (1982)), the benefits are still constrained by the number of independent observations 
(see the discussion in Section II.B above).  There are two sources for the serial correlation of the error 
term. The first arises from sampling annual exchange rate changes on a monthly basis, leading to a 
moving average structure out to 11 months. Sampling at the monthly frequency improves the efficiency of 
the estimators but only to a degree (Boudoukh and Richardson (1994)). The second potential source arises 
directly from the j-step ahead forecast. For the regression in equation (6), however, the degree of serial 
correlation in the errors depends upon the relative variance of exchange rates versus interest rate 
differentials, and the correlation of unexpected shocks to these variables. There are strong reasons to 
suspect that these factors mitigate the serial correlation problem. Table 1, Panel A shows that exchange 
rates are much more variable than interest rate differentials and are relatively unpredictable. Therefore, 
because the forecast update component of the residual in equation (6) is likely to be small relative to the 
unpredictable component as we move forward in time, the induced serial correlation in the errors will be 
correspondingly small, and the overlap will not substantially reduce the effective number of independent 
observations. This intuition is confirmed through a Monte Carlo simulation described later on in this 
section. 
Table 2 describes estimates over different horizons and across different currencies for tests of the 
expectations hypothesis of exchange rates through equation (6). In contrast to Table 1, Panel C and the 
conclusions in much of the literature, Table 2 shows that forward interest rate differentials can predict 
changes in future exchange rates. At least as important is that their predictive power has the right sign. 
The U.S./Germany forward interest rate differentials of one to four years yield coefficients of 0.65, 0.68, 
2.01, and 3.17 for the USD/DEM exchange rate. The results for the USD/GBP exhibit a similar pattern, 
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with coefficients of 0.96, 3.37, 1.95, and 2.56 looking forward one to four years, respectively. These 
results are quite different from the significant negative coefficients that plagued Table 1, Panel C. 
The coefficient estimates exhibit two apparent features in addition to the fact that they are 
positive. First, they tend to increase in the horizon. Second, for longer horizons they seem to exceed the 
theoretical value of 1. However, these coefficient estimates are noisy, especially at longer horizons, so 
more formal tests are warranted. As Table 2, Panel B reports, joint tests of the hypothesis that β = 1 at 
each horizon across the currencies yields only one rejection (j=2) and three non-rejections (j=1, 3, and 4) 
at the 5% level using the Wald test. None of the four Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests generate rejections at 
the 5% level, with p-values ranging from 20% to 95%.9  Table 2B also documents tests across horizons 
for a given currency and across currencies. Testing the null hypothesis of β =1 across horizons j=1, 2, 3, 
and 4 (but not j=0), the LM test does not reject the null for either currency, and the Wald test rejects it for 
the USD/GBP, but with a p-value of 0.08, hence only at the 10% level but not at the 5% level. Across 
currencies, the Wald test again rejects, but the LM test does not. These results contrast starkly with those 
for the one-year horizon (j=0), which generate rejections of uncovered interest rate parity for both tests 
and a restricted coefficient estimate of –0.75. 
Note that in Table 2 the regression R2s have a tendency to increase with the horizon. While the 
dependent variable, i.e., annual exchange rate changes, is the same, the forecasting variable differs. For 
the USD/GBP [USD/DEM], the R2s are higher for three [two] out of four of the forward interest rate 
differential regressions (equation (6)) than for the interest rate differential regression (equation (2)). What 
is remarkable about this result is that the information in the former regressions is (i) old relative to current 
interest rates, and (ii) more subject to measurement error due to the calculation of forward rates. We argue 
below that this finding is an important clue to understanding the fundamental relation between exchange 
rates, inflation, and interest rates, and, more importantly, the forward premium anomaly. 
One potential concern is that the standard errors are spuriously low and the R2s are spuriously 
high due to small sample problems in the longer horizon regressions. We argue above that the overlap 
problem is not that serious due to the relatively low predictability of exchange rate changes, but it is still 
important to verify this conjecture. Consequently, we construct a Monte Carlo experiment in which we 
employ a VAR for the relevant forward interest rate differentials, spot interest rate differentials, and 
changes in exchange rates, imposing the expectations hypotheses of interest rates and using two different 
models for exchange rates. In one experiment we impose the expectations hypothesis for exchange rates, 
                                                 
9 Throughout this study, we employ both the Lagrange multiplier and Wald statistics for testing the joint hypotheses. 
As shown by Berndt and Savin (1977), there is a numerical ordering between these statistics, which may lead to 
different inferences being drawn. For an especially relevant discussion, see Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) in the 
context of testing the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. In their context, the Wald test over-rejects while 
the Lagrange multiplier test under-rejects, results that are consistent with our simulation evidence discussed later. 
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i.e., we assume uncovered interest rate parity holds, and in the other experiment we assume exchange 
rates follow a random walk, i.e., exchange rate changes are unpredictable. We also consider two different 
distributional assumptions for the shocks to exchange rate changes. In the first analysis, we assume that 
the shocks across all equations follow a multivariate normal distribution. In the second analysis, we 
resample the shocks to exchange rates from the series of monthly exchange rate changes observed in the 
data. We then simulate these models, generating 100,000 replications of 428 monthly observations. For 
each replication, we aggregate the data to an annual frequency, as in the empirical analysis, and we then 
estimate equation (6) and the long-horizon regression version of equation (2) following Chinn and 
Meredith (2005). Thus we can assess the small sample properties of our specification and also compare 
them to those of the alternative long-horizon regressions. The second and third to last columns of Table 2, 
Panel A and Table 3 report the key results. (The experiment itself is detailed in Appendix A.) 
In Table 2, Panel A we report the cross-sectional standard deviation (across replications) of 
relevant parameter estimate (in the column “SD”), and the two-sided simulated P-value for the test that β 
= 1 (in the column “P-value”), i.e., the percentage of the replications in which the absolute magnitude of 
deviation of the estimated coefficient from one equaled or exceeded the deviation for the estimated 
coefficient from the actual data. For these calculations, we simulate under the null hypothesis of β = 1 and 
use the resampled exchange rate changes for the relevant exchange rate, but simulating under normality 
produces similar results. The cross-sectional standard deviations tend to exceed the reported standard 
errors, especially at longer horizons, suggesting that these standard errors may be somewhat understated. 
However, the inferences drawn from the P-values are consistent with those from standard hypothesis test 
of the individual coefficients. Specifically, the short-horizon (j=0) coefficients are statistically 
significantly different from one, as is the coefficient for j=2 for the USD/GBP. 
Table 3, Panel A compares the R2s from the regressions in equation (6), i.e., using forward 
interest rate differentials, to those from the long-horizon versions of the regression in equation (2), i.e., 
using long-horizon spot rate differentials, under the expectation hypothesis of exchange rates (βj = 1). The 
statistics in this panel, and in the remainder of Table 3, are calculated from simulations that resample 
from the USD/GBP exchange rate changes because this series exhibits the most excess kurtosis, but 
inferences from simulations under normality or using the USD/DEM exchange rate changes are similar. 
When one uses equation (6), the biases in the R2s are clearly less severe than in the corresponding long-
horizon regressions. As the horizon goes from one to four years, the bias, i.e., the difference between the 
mean R2 from the simulations and the true R2, ranges from 2.68% (5.92% simulated versus 3.24% true 
infinite sample R2) to 2.60% for regressions using forward interest rates, versus an increase from 4.49% 
(11.28% simulated versus 6.79% true) to 6.71% for the long-horizon spot rate regressions.  
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Equally problematic for the long-horizon regressions, there is much less independent information 
in these regressions compared with the forward interest rate regressions. The correlations between the 
coefficient estimators range from 0.68 to 0.97 across the various horizons in the long-horizon regressions, 
in contrast to a much lower range of correlations, from 0.36 to 0.86, in the forward interest rate 
regressions.10 
Table 3, Panel B reports the results under the assumption that the exchange rate follows a random 
walk (βj = 0). Again the forward interest rate regressions have smaller biases in R2s relative to the long-
horizon regressions, and there is considerably more independent information in the former regression 
system. The regressions using the forward interest rate differentials have a bias that ranges from 2.79% to 
3.10%, while the biases in the long-horizon regressions increase with the horizon up to 9.99%. Overall, 
these simulation results suggest that small sample bias cannot explain the large differences in R2s across 
horizons found in the data, and that the forward interest rate regressions have better statistical properties 
than the corresponding long-horizon regressions. 
Table 3, Panel C presents simulation results for the Wald and Lagrange multiplier tests for the 
regressions in equation (6) across the horizons with βj  = 1. Consistent with Berndt and Savin (1997) and 
Bekaert and Hodrick (2001), the Wald test substantially over-rejects the null hypothesis, while the LM 
test tends to under-reject the null hypothesis, especially for high significance levels. For example, for the 
hypothesis j  = 1 across all four horizons, the LM test rejects only 4.6% and 0.2% of the time at the 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively, while the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis in 28.0% and 14.2% of the 
simulations. Moreover, while the LM test performs similarly for both the j  = 1 and j equal hypotheses, 
the small sample properties of the Wald test are much worse for the hypothesis j  = 1.  
 
III. A Simple Model of Exchange Rates and the Forward Premium Anomaly 
We believe the results provided in Section II add important stylized facts that need to be explained in the 
context of recent attempts at solving the forward premium puzzle of exchange rates. First, there is the 
need to reconcile the forward premium anomaly (i.e., a negative β in equation (2)) with the forward 
interest rate differential results (i.e., positive βs in equation (6)). Second, the coefficients in the forward 
interest rate differential regressions appear to increase in maturity and exceed the theoretical value of 1 
for longer horizons. Third, the explanatory power of the forward interest rate differential also increases in 
the horizon over which the regressions are estimated, i.e., with information about countries’ future interest 
rates that becomes increasingly stale. 
                                                 
10 The coefficient estimates are slightly downward biased in both cases, but these results are omitted for brevity. 
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In this section, we present a simple, reduced-form model of exchange rates, interest rates and 
inflation rates across countries. Though simple in structure, the model is built around assumptions 
consistent with the existing literature, and it can provide one potential explanation for the observed 
behavior of uncovered interest rate parity at short and long horizons. 
 
A. A Simple, Reduced-Form Model of Exchange Rates  
Our reduced-form model has four components, dealing with interest rates, inflation rates, forward rates of 
interest, and exchange rates. For simplicity, we focus on fundamentals related only to inflation rates, 
assuming that real growth across countries is constant. Also, for ease of exposition and without loss of 
generality, all variables are mean-adjusted, that is, we suppress all constants in the equations. We also 
assume symmetry between countries and focus on just two horizons, which we denote periods 1 and 2. 
The first key feature of our model is how interest rates are formed in each country, and, in 
particular, the source of their “distortion” from fundamentals, in this case, from expectations about future 
inflation rates. While previous research has motivated such distortions in terms of risk or biased 
expectations, we choose to model it in terms of a Taylor (1993) rule in which the monetary authority of 
each country sets the short-term interest rate to temper inflation: 
0][][ ,11,1,1,    ttttttttt EirE ,    (7) 
where ][ 1, ttt rE  is the expected 1-period real rate, 1,ti  is the 1-period nominal rate, and tt ,1  is the 
inflation rate (all in log form). In other words, when inflation is above its mean, the central bank increases 
interest rates, which leads, in expectation, to time-varying real rates that are proportional to the level of 
inflation. While based on a simple Taylor rule, this model is broadly consistent with recent more elaborate 
empirical specifications and tests of Taylor rules in the context of the exchange rate literature, including 
Engel and West (2006), Engel, Nelson, and West (2007), Clarida and Waldman (2007), and Mark (2009), 
among others. 
The second feature of our model is an autoregressive process for inflation in each country. We 
propose a simple AR(1) model though more elaborate specifications could be modeled. The idea is that 
the application of the Taylor rule, combined with the underlying fundamentals of the economy, leads to: 
1,,11,   tttttt   .      (8) 
The third feature of the model is the determination of long-term interest rates or, equivalently, 
forward rates. While there is empirical evidence of violations of the expectations hypothesis of interest 
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rates,11 for simplicity we impose the expectations hypothesis in the model. Specifically, we set the 
forward interest rate equal to the expectation of the future spot rate: 
][ 1,1
2,1
 ttt iEif ,             (9) 
where 2,1tif  is the forward interest rate between t+1 and t+2 set at time t. Thus, forward rates anticipate 
any future distortions in spot rates associated with the Taylor rule specified in equation (7). Imposing the 
expectations hypothesis reduces the degrees of freedom available in the model and thus potentially 
reduces its ability to match the empirical evidence. 
The final, and most important, feature of the model describes the evolution of exchange rates. 
Motivated by the existing literature, exchange rate changes are broken down into three pieces as follows: 
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The first piece is the starting point for all exchange rate determination models, namely purchasing 
power parity (PPP), and simply states that exchange rate changes should reflect inflation rate differentials 
between the two countries. That is, for an exchange rate expressed in dollars per unit of foreign currency, 
when U.S. inflation is high the exchange rate increases and the dollar depreciates. 
The second piece reflects that, with the Taylor rule distortion given in equation (7), expected real 
rates are no longer constant across countries. Countries with expected inflation that is high relative to 
their mean target inflation levels will have higher expected real rates. What do differences in expected 
real rates then imply about exchange rate determination?  
A popular description for exchange rate determination can be found in the literature on the 
aforementioned carry trade in which investors borrow in low interest rate currencies and invest in high 
interest rate currencies. Specifically, a relatively high expected real rate in the U.S. causes capital inflows, 
dollar appreciation, and a fall in the exchange rate (e.g., Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleschelski, and Rebelo 
(2006), Clarida, Davis, and Pedersen (2009), Farhi, Fraiberger, Gabaix, Ranciere, and Verdelhan (2009), 
Jorda and Taylor (2009), and Jurek (2009), among others).  One preferred explanation is that the carry 
trade and resulting appreciation of the currency is compensation for the possibility of a crash in the 
currency’s value – the so-called “up the stairs, down the elevator” description of high interest rate 
currencies (e.g., Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009) and Plantin and Shin (2010)). 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Fama and Bliss (1987), recently updated by Fama (2004), for U.S. data and Jorion and Mishkin 
(1991) for international evidence. 
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This view of the carry trade and crash risk premia has a theoretical basis in Farhi and Gabaix 
(2008), but can be viewed more generally in the context of the larger literature that argues for expected 
currency appreciation due to the existence of a time-varying risk premium that is negatively correlated 
with interest rate differentials (see, e.g., Fama (1984a), Bekaert (1996), Mark and Wu (1998), Backus, 
Foresi, and Telmer (2001), Graveline (2006), Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), Lustig, Roussanov and 
Verdelhan (2008), Verdelhan (2010), and Backus, Gavazzoni, Telmer, and Zin (2010)). The literature is 
not completely sold on the risk premium argument. Alternative stories focus on justifications based on 
limited arbitrage or segmentation in the foreign exchange market (e.g., Froot and Thaler (1990), Froot and 
Ramadorai (2005), Stein (2009), and Jylha and Suominen (2010)).  
In the above formulation, δ is negative because a high expected real rate in the U.S. represents 
compensation for crash risk, or implies capital inflows and dollar appreciation within limits to arbitrage. 
In particular, if δ = 0, purchasing power parity holds. If δ < 0, real rate differentials have a permanent 
effect on exchange rates, i.e., the deviation from PPP persists and accumulates each period.  
While we do not take a view on the precise description of the carry trade phenomena, our reduced 
form model does include a third component of exchange rate determination based on the crash intuition. 
There is a substantive body of evidence that points to PPP holding in the long run and therefore being an 
important building block for exchange rates (see, e.g., Abuaf and Jorion (1990), Kim (1990), Rogoff 
(1996), Lothian and Taylor (1996), Taylor (2001, 2002), and Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn, and Rey (2005)). 
Specifically, while the carry trade component allows exchange rates to deviate from PPP due to 
differentials in real rates, we posit a positive probability that exchange rates will revert to PPP. For 
simplicity, and in order to facilitate the calculation of closed form solutions, we model this reversion as a 
crash back to PPP in a single period, but one could easily envision extending the model to richer patterns 
of reversion. Dt+1 is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 when a crash occurs, 0 otherwise. When a 
crash occurs, all deviations from PPP since the last crash, which occurred W~  periods ago, are reversed. 
Initially, we model exchange rates reverting to PPP with a fixed probability p each period: 

 -p
p
Dt 1 prob.with 0
 prob.with 1
1      (11) 
so that pDE t  ][ 1  and 1)1(]~Pr[  nppnW . Later on, in subsection C of this section, we 
generalize the probability of correction to be state (i.e., PPP deviation) dependent. 
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B. Implications for Uncovered Interest Rate Parity at Short and Long Horizons 
The model for interest rates, inflation rates, and exchange rates described by equations (7) – (11) has 
implications for the typical forward premium regression given in equation (2) and our novel forward 
interest rate differential regression in equation (6). 
Consider first the UIP regression, 1
*
1,1,01, )(   ttttt uiis  . Appendix B of the paper shows: 
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The UIP regression coefficient is the sum of three terms.  
The first term reflects the direct effect of inflation differentials on exchange rate changes via PPP. 
If interest rates fully reflect fundamentals and there are no Taylor rule distortions (γ = 0 in equation (7)), 
then β0 = 1 and UIP holds exactly. If there are no Taylor rule distortions, then expected real rate 
differentials are zero, and there are no deviations of exchange rates from PPP, i.e., the second and third 
terms in equation (12) are zero. If there are Taylor rule distortions (γ > 0), but exchange rates still follow 
PPP (δ = 0), then 0 < β0 < 1. In this case, even though expected real rates are different across countries, 
this divergence has no effect on exchange rates because δ = 0, there are no PPP violations to reverse, and 
again the second and third terms in equation (12) are zero. For example, if inflation is persistent (e.g., θ = 
0.8 in equation (8)), and the typical Taylor rule adjusts interest rates by half the amount inflation diverges 
from its target mean (e.g., γ = 0.5 in equation (7)), then the coefficient in the UIP regression is β0 = 0.62. 
This means that even if PPP holds, then UIP can be violated as the Taylor rule implies interest rates 
respond more to inflation shocks than exchange rates. Of course, a similar result would hold if the 
response was behavioral in nature (e.g., overreaction along the lines of Burnside, Han, and Hirshleifer 
(2011)).  
The second term reflects the carry trade component of exchange rate changes due to expected real 
rate differentials. If there are Taylor rule distortions (γ > 0), and the real rate, carry trade component 
affects exchange rates (δ < 0) so that PPP does not hold, then the second term in equation (12) is negative. 
If there are no crashes, then the third term is zero, and the regression coefficient is strictly less than that 
when PPP does hold. In fact, β0 can now go negative, when δγ < -1, and the coefficient decreases as δ 
decreases. In other words, the carry trade effect works in achieving the correct coefficient provided in 
Table 1, Panel C. For example, under the parameters for inflation and the Taylor rule described above 
(i.e., θ = 0.8, γ = 0.5), for δ equal to -1, -5, and -10, β0 equals 0.31, -0.92, and -2.46, respectively. From an 
economic standpoint, a value of δ = -5 implies that a domestic currency will appreciate 5% over the 
following year if domestic real rates are expected to be 1% higher than those in the foreign country. 
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The final term characterizes the reversion component. If there are Taylor rule distortions (γ > 0), a 
carry trade component (δ < 0), and a positive probability that exchange rates will revert back to PPP, then 
the effect of the crash component on the regression coefficient partially (or even fully) reverses the effect 
of the carry trade. In fact, if the probability of a crash back to PPP is one every period, then the carry trade 
effect disappears and  0 . The carry trade effect on exchange rates is reversed by an immediate 
reversion back to PPP, and there are no longer any PPP violations. The intuition behind the third term in 
equation (12) is that the current interest rate differential has information not only about future real rate 
differentials, which, due to the carry trade, leads to exchange rate appreciation, but also about past interest 
rate differentials, which, depending on the probability of a crash, tell us something about the future 
magnitude of the crash in the exchange rate. For example, under the parameters for inflation and the 
Taylor rule described above (i.e., θ = 0.8, γ = 0.5), and considering δ = -5 and -10, β0 increases from -0.92 
to -0.33, and from -2.46 to -1.27, respectively as the probability of a crash (p) goes from 0% to 7%. 
The forward premium regressions expressed in terms of longer maturity forward interest rate 
differentials in equation (6) produce very different results than the standard UIP regressions in equation 
(2). Therefore, we next turn to the implications of our reduced form model given in equations (7)-(11) for 
the UIP regression with forward interest rate differentials, 1
*2,1
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The first two terms are identical to those of 0  in equation (12). Under the expectations hypothesis of 
interest rates, which we impose in our model, the forward interest rate differential is the expected future 
spot interest rate differential, and regressing exchange rate changes on these two quantities yields 
identical results in a world without reversion to PPP.  
The difference between the two coefficients is 



 



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1)1(
2
2
01
p
pp
 .    (14) 
If there is either a 0% or 100% probability of a crash, then the two UIP coefficients are the same. 
Interestingly, and consistent with the regression results in Table 2, for economically relevant parameters
1 is always greater than 0 when the crash probability 0 <  p < 1. For example, under the parameters for 
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inflation and the Taylor rule described above (i.e., θ = 0.8, γ = 0.5), and a crash probability of p = 7%, and 
considering δ = -5 and -10, β0 = -0.33 versus β1 = -0.12, and β0 = -1.27 versus β1 = -0.86, respectively.  
The intuition is that the forward interest rate differential has more information about the 
magnitude of the existing deviation from PPP, and thus the impact of a currency crash, than does the 
current interest rate differential. The current interest rate differential contains information about prior 
inflation rate differentials, and thus the buildup of PPP violations, due to the persistence of inflation, but 
this information decays as one goes back in time. In contrast, the lagged forward interest rate differential 
captures the actual inflation differential last period. This same differential has information both about the 
current inflation differential and inflation differentials further back in time, again due to the persistence of 
inflation. This intuition also suggests that if inflation is persistent, so that Taylor rule deviations will 
persist, then long-horizon forward interest rate differentials (even if stale) will contain considerable 
information about the magnitude of future currency crashes. Thus, the difference in equation (14) may 
increase with horizon, a main finding from the regression results in Table 2. 
We could calculate the forward interest rate differential coefficients for longer horizons in closed 
form (similar to equation (13)), but the horizon dependence is most easily illustrated using numerical 
results for reasonable parameter values. Therefore, we simulate the model given in equations (7)-(11), and 
report the regression results in Table 4. Table 4 provides results for the standard UIP regression with 
interest rate differentials and for the forward interest rate differential regressions in equation (6), for 
horizons of 1-4 years, for a variety of parameters:  = 0.0, 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7; δ = 0, -5, -10, -15, and -20; θ 
= 0.8; and p = 7%. Shocks to inflation in the two countries, as given in equation (8), are assumed to be 
normally distributed, and the coefficient estimates are not affected by the choice of the variance of these 
innovations or their correlation across countries. 
The top panel illustrates the point made above that, when there are no Taylor rule distortions (γ = 
0), the coefficient equals 1 at all horizons. The small deviations from one in the second decimal place 
indicate the precision of the simulated coefficient estimates relative to their true values. The top line in 
each of the four panels illustrates the second point that, when there is no carry trade effect (δ = 0), the 
coefficient is independent of the horizon. However, this coefficient declines as the magnitude of the 
Taylor rule distortion increases because interest rates are a magnified function of inflation. 
Most important, for each non-zero value of  (i.e., Taylor rule distortion) and δ (i.e., carry trade 
effect), the coefficient is increasing in the horizon. The UIP regression coefficient (β0) and the rate of 
increase depend jointly on the two parameters. Holding the magnitude of the Taylor rule distortion fixed, 
increasing the magnitude of the carry trade effect (moving down the lines within a panel), decreases the 
coefficients at the short horizon, as argued above, and for sufficiently large magnitudes the UIP 
regression coefficient is negative. The carry trade parameter is also the primary determinant of the range 
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of the coefficients from short to long horizons, with this range increasing in the magnitude of δ. However, 
there is also clearly an interaction effect between the Taylor rule distortion and the carry trade effect. 
Reasonable parameterizations (e.g.,  = 0.5, δ = -5) can induce a switch in the sign of the 
coefficient as the horizon increases. For short horizons, the carry trade effect dominates and the 
coefficient is negative. For longer horizons, the role of the forward interest rate differential as a proxy for 
the magnitude of the PPP violation and hence the size of a crash, should it occur, becomes the more 
important factor, and the coefficient becomes positive. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients at 
longer horizons generated by the model in this scenario are smaller than those in the data. 
Finally, the last 5 columns of Table 4 present the R2s from the regressions. As expected, when 
there is no carry trade component, the R2s are high and decrease in the horizon of the regression. 
Exchange rate changes depend on realized inflation differentials, which are predicted well by spot interest 
rate differentials, but less so by lagged forward interest rate differentials. The R2s are much lower when 
there is a carry trade component and crashes back to PPP that reverse this component. The magnitudes of 
the R2s are of less interest because they depend critically on the fact that we assume reversion to PPP 
occurs in a single period, creating large exchange rate moves that dominate the variation in exchange rate 
changes. More interesting are the patterns in these R2s. For large carry trade effects, the coefficient in the 
standard UIP regression is large in magnitude (e.g., -2.89 for   = 0.7, δ = -15 versus -0.32 for   = 0.5, δ = 
-5), and the relative R2 is also large (2.36% versus 0.41%). This explained variation declines in horizon as 
the coefficient begins to pick up the offsetting crash component. For example, for   = 0.7, δ = -15, the R2s 
are 2.36%, 0.83%, 0.17%, and 0.00% for horizons 0 to 3. However, as the crash component begins to 
dominate at even longer horizons, the R2 can increase, e.g., from 0.00% to 0.03% for the parameters 
above. 
 
C. Extending the Exchange Rate Model 
The reduced form model described in Section III.A above can potentially be extended in several ways to 
better fit existing stylized facts. One natural generalization is to relax the assumption in the exchange rate 
determination model described in equation (10) of a constant probability of a currency crash back to PPP. 
The purpose of this assumption is to allow for closed-form expressions for the coefficients in the 
exchange rate regressions in equations (2) and (6). However, both theories based on speculative dynamics 
(e.g., Plantin and Shin (2010)) and existing empirical work (e.g., Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen 
(2009) and Jorda and Taylor (2009)) imply that this probability should be increasing in the deviation from 
PPP. In other words, as the exchange rate moves further and further from its fundamental PPP relation, 
the tension to bring it back increases. 
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We model the time-varying crash probability in a simple way: 
t
t
t PPPDw
PPPDw
p  1 ,      (15) 
where |PPPDt| is the absolute deviation of the exchange rate from its value implied under PPP at time t, 
and w is a scalar chosen to match a specific unconditional crash probability, which we denote p . Thus, pt 
varies through time, increasing in the current deviation of the exchange rate from PPP.  
 Table 5, Panel A presents what is essentially a rough calibration of this extended model to the 
empirical results in Table 2. We present both the slope coefficients for the forward premium regression 
for horizons up to 4 years and the associated R2s. In addition to varying the magnitude of the Taylor rule 
distortion (γ) and the carry trade effect (δ), we also vary the persistence of the inflation process (θ) and the 
unconditional crash probability ( p ), which amounts to varying the parameter w in equation (15). We 
consider variations in the parameters around a plausible benchmark of γ = 0.5, δ = -10, p  = 7%, and θ = 
0.8. 
 The results for the benchmark parameterization are presented in the first row of the table, and it is 
clear why we have chosen these parameter values. The coefficient in the UIP regression is negative, it 
switches signs for the regression with forward interest rate differentials at a horizon of 1 year, and it 
increases in horizon to a value substantially greater than one at longer horizons, all consistent with the 
empirical evidence presented in Table 2. In other words, our reduced form model of exchange rates is 
able to explain the striking results presented earlier. 
 The intuition for these results is the same as that discussed earlier for the simpler model with a 
constant crash probability. The interest rate differential picks up the carry trade effect, which reverses the 
sign of the coefficient relative to the standard UIP intuition. However, there is a second offsetting effect. 
Spot and forward interest rate differentials also proxy for the magnitude of the deviation of exchange rates 
from PPP. This deviation will be reversed at some point, and this reversal is, by definition, a movement of 
exchange rates in the direction opposite to the carry trade effect. At the short horizon, the former effect 
dominates. At a horizon of 1 year, the effects are almost offsetting, and the coefficient is close to zero. 
However, at long horizons the crash effect becomes more important. Because crashes are relatively rare, 
large deviations from PPP can build up, and the resulting exchange rate move will be large, thus the 
coefficient can exceed one at long horizons. 
 The patterns in the regression R2s are consistent with the empirical results of Table 2. At short 
horizons, explained variation is low because the independent variable is picking up both the carry trade 
effect and the offsetting reversion to PPP. However, at long horizons, the crash effect is dominant and the 
R2 is many times larger than at the shortest horizon, i.e., 0.21% at horizon 0 versus 1.41% at horizon 4. 
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The subsequent pairs of parameterizations below the benchmark case in Table 5 illustrate the 
marginal effects associated with each parameter in the model. For each pair, we perturb a single 
parameter, highlighted in bold, above and below its level in the benchmark case. The marginal effects of 
the Taylor rule distortion (γ) and the carry trade (δ) are similar. In both cases, as these parameters increase 
in magnitude, the horizon effect increases, i.e., the short-horizon coefficient becomes more negative, and 
the long-horizon coefficient becomes more positive. This magnification of the horizon effect occurs 
because both the PPP violations, via the carry trade effect, and the size of the associated crashes back to 
PPP increase as the magnitudes of γ and δ increase. In the former case, for a given inflation differential, 
the magnitude of the interest rate differential and the corresponding expected real rate differential is 
larger, while in the later case, a given expected real rate differential has a larger effect on exchange rates.  
Holding the other parameters constant, decreasing the persistence of inflation also causes a 
magnification of the horizon effect. This decrease reduces the relation between forward interest rates and 
spot interest rates, i.e., the expectation hypothesis of interest rates still holds, but the innovation in these 
expectations over time is relatively larger and inflation reverts more quickly to its mean. As a result, spot 
interest rate differentials continue to contain information about the carry trade effect but contain less 
information about lagged interest rate differentials and thus the magnitude of existing PPP violations. 
Similarly, forward interest rate differentials contain information about the build-up of PPP violations in 
the corresponding period, but they contain less information about future spot interest rates and thus the 
future carry trade effect. This improved separation of the two effects increases the coefficient estimates. 
Finally, the unconditional crash probability shifts the coefficients at all horizons in the same 
direction. As the crash probability decreases, the coefficients decrease as well. As a crash becomes less 
likely in any given year, the carry trade effect, which generates a negative relation between interest rate 
differentials and exchange rates, becomes more important relative to the crash effect. 
Of course, while the model is relatively simple, the relations between the exchange rates and 
interest rate differentials are nonlinear, and the above analysis does not capture all the potential complex 
interactions. Moreover, the marginal effect of a single parameter does depend on the values of the other 
variables. 
 
D. Additional Implications of the Model 
Sections III.B and III.C above show that the forward premium regressions of equations (2) and (6) have 
considerable common information. In the closed-form solutions, two of the three terms in the regression 
coefficients are identical, and the third one has a similar structure. The fact that the β0 and β1 regression 
coefficients in equations (12) and (13) are similar should not be surprising. Under the expectations 
hypothesis of interest rates: 
20 
 
 
if
ttttt
ttttt
ififii
iiEifif





*2,112,11*1,1,
*
1,1,1
*2,1
1
2,1
1 ,    (16) 
where ift
 is the forecast error associated with forward interest rate differentials with the property that 
  0,cov *2,112,11   ifttt ifif  . What is surprising is that these two closely related independent variables can 
generate such different regression coefficients, especially at longer horizons, both in the data and in our 
simple model. As argued above, the explanation is that both variables capture two offsetting effects. As 
the balance between these effects changes at different horizons, the sign of the coefficient also changes. 
 Given the apparent existence of two offsetting effects, a logical step would be to attempt to 
disentangle these effects in a bivariate regression. In the context of the model, any two variables, e.g., the 
spot and forward interest rate differentials, will do as long as they are not perfectly correlated. From an 
empirical perspective, we need to find variables that are less correlated in order to avoid multicollinearity 
problems in our relatively small sample. A natural approach is to separate the interest rate differential into 
two terms, its expected value based on the forward interest rate differential )( *2,11
2,1
1   tt ifif , and the 
unexpected shock to interest rates over this period, as measured by )()( *2,11
2,1
1
*
1,1,   tttt ififii . In 
particular, consider the following regression: 
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Under the expectation hypothesis of interest rates, these variables are uncorrelated. Under UIP both 
coefficients will equal one. However, under the reduced form model of equations (7)–(11), with a 
constant crash probability, Appendix B shows that 
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The coefficient 1  equals 1  from equation (13) because the independent variables are 
uncorrelated, 0  is a slightly simplified version of 0 , and, for 0 < p < 1, 1 > 0 . The difference between 
the coefficients can be expressed as 
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Of particular interest, it is quite possible for 1  to be positive and 0 to be negative. For example, under 
the parameters for inflation and the Taylor rule with θ = 0.8, γ = 0.3, δ = -5 and p=7%, we get 1 =0.20 
and 0 = -0.20. Because )( *1,1, tt ii   is broken into )(
*2,1
1
2,1
1   tt ifif  and )()( *2,112,11*1,1,   tttt ififii , the 
opposite coefficients for 1  and 0 mean, in practice, that the standard UIP regression coefficient, 0 , 
will be close to zero and generate low R2s, the typical finding in this literature for exchange rate 
determination. For example, under the parameters for inflation and the Taylor rule described above with θ 
= 0.8, γ = 0.3, δ = -5 and p=7%, indeed 0 =0.06. 
Table 5, Panel B provides simulation results for multiple horizons for the extended model with 
time-varying crash probabilities for the regression 
1
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





  tjj jtjj jtjjj jtjj jtttjtt uififififiis  .           (20) 
The second subscript on the 0  coefficient indicates that the variable is the difference between the spot 
interest rate differential (at horizon 0) and the forward interest rate differential at horizon j. We report 
results for the same parameter values used in Table 5. 
 As expected j , i.e., the coefficient on the forward interest rate differential, equals j , i.e., the 
coefficient on the forward interest rate differential in the univariate regression in Table 5, Panel A up to 
some small amount of simulation noise.  More interesting are the coefficients on the innovation term         
( j,0 ). These coefficients are significantly more negative than the coefficient in the UIP regression ( 0  
in Table 5, Panel A) because the second variable is now controlling for the crash effect that was 
attenuating the carry trade effect primarily picked up by the spot interest rate differential. In all cases, the 
magnitudes decrease slightly in horizon with changes in the balance between the offsetting effects 
captured by the two variables. 
 The R2s of the regressions are also interesting. They exceed those of the univariate forward 
premium regression by a significant amount at all horizons, e.g., from 1.23% to 2.50% versus 0.06% to 
1.41% at horizons 1 to 4 for the benchmark parameterization. Moreover, they are increasing in horizon 
because spot and forward interest rate differentials that are separated further in time provide more 
information about the offsetting carry trade and crash effects. 
 While the regression in equation (20) clearly provides a useful decomposition of the carry trade 
and crash effects, it is a somewhat indirect approach to this problem. In the model, there are two key state 
variables—the interest rate differential and the deviation of the current exchange rate from that implied by 
purchasing power parity. The former variable picks up the carry trade effect, while the latter measures the 
size and direction of the exchange rate move in the event of a reversion (crash) to fundamentals (PPP) and 
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also the probability of such a reversion in the extended model with a time-varying crash probability. 
Consequently, a natural analysis is a regression of exchange rate changes on these two variables, i.e., 
1
*
1,1,211, )(   tttttt iiPPPDs  .     (21) 
Table 5, Panel C provides simulation results for this regression and special cases thereof.  
 For the benchmark parameter values, we report results for the standard UIP regression, which are 
also reported in the first line of Table 5, Panel A; for the regression with only the PPP deviation variable; 
and for the bivariate regression. When include alone, the PPP deviation has a negative coefficient, i.e., 
deviations will be reversed in the future, and the R2 is high relative to the regressions with interest rate 
differentials, i.e., 7.75% versus a maximum of 1.41% in Panel A and 2.50% in Panel B. The actual 
deviation from PPP is a better predictor than interest rate differentials that provide a noisy proxy for this 
deviation based on the inflation differential in a single period. When included together, the magnitude of 
the coefficients on both variables increase dramatically from their counterparts in the univariate 
regressions—from -0.13 to -0.21 on the PPP deviation and from -0.41 to -2.67 on the interest rate 
differential. While the deviation from PPP measures the magnitude of a crash, should it occur, it is also 
related to current inflation differentials and hence the carry trade component as well. Including a direct 
measure of this component thus increases the explanatory power of both variables.  
 
IV. Empirical Analysis of the Exchange Rate Model 
The theoretical results of Section III provide a way to reconcile the forward premium anomaly (regression 
equation (2)) with the forward interest rate differential results (regression equation (6)) across multiple 
horizons. This section analyzes the additional implications of the model described in Section III.D. 
Table 6 documents results for the regression  
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
  tjj jtjj jtjjj jtjj jtttjjtt uififififiis  .   (22) 
for each exchange rate and horizon. Across all of the horizons and across both currencies, the coefficient 
j  is always positive for the USD/GBP and USD/DEM, and generally increasing (albeit noisily) in 
horizon, consistent with the simulation results in Table 5, Panel B.  In contrast, the j,0  coefficients are 
all negative and declining in magnitude as the horizon increases, again in line with the simulation 
evidence. The R2s are quite impressive. 
For example, for the USD/DEM exchange rate, at forward rate horizons of one to four years, the 
j s are 0.53, 0.24, 1.32, and 2.39, respectively, while the j,0 s are –2.28, –1.01, –0.96, and –0.89. 
Similar to the results in Table 2, it is difficult to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the forward 
interest rate differential are equal to 1. In Panel B, only the Wald test across horizons and currencies is 
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able to reject this hypothesis at the 5% level, with an additional rejection at the 10% level for the Wald 
test across horizons for the USD/GBP. In contrast, there is convincing statistical evidence that the 
coefficient on the unexpected component is not equal to 1. In Panel C, a large number of both the Wald 
and LM statistics are significant at the 5% level. 
The negative j,0  explains why the forward premium anomaly exists from a statistical 
viewpoint—that is, why we get negative coefficients and low R2s in Table 1. Breaking up current interest 
rates into the two components separates information about the magnitude and probability of future 
currency crashes contained in the forward curve from current interest rates. Including them together, the 
two information sources offset each other, leading to a low R2. 
From the standpoint of the model, the positive and increasing coefficients on the forward interest 
rate differentials are capturing the probability and magnitude of a currency crash back to PPP, while the 
negative coefficients on the forecast error in the exchange rate regression are capturing the carry trade 
effect. 
We argue that dated (i.e., old) information in forward rate differentials is important because these 
differentials predict the crash component of future changes in exchange rates. An alternative story is that 
there is simply additional information in the term structure of interest rates about future exchange rates 
that has nothing to do with the fundamentals of our model. If this were the case, then presumably forward 
interest rates contemporaneous with the spot rates in the standard forward premium regression would 
provide better information than lagged differentials, since they contain newer information. In the context 
of the model in Section III, adding contemporaneous forward interest rate differentials would have no 
effect at all on the explanatory power. They contain identical information to that in the spot interest rate 
differentials about inflation rate differentials. 
Table 7 investigates this conjecture via estimation of the regressions 
1
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
  tjjtjjtjjjtjjtttjjtt uififififiis  .   (23) 
These regressions are analogous to those in equation (22), with results presented in Table 6, Panel A, 
except that the regressor is the contemporaneous (time t) forward interest rate instead of the lagged 
forward interest rate. The notable result is that the R2s of these regressions are extremely low, ranging 
from 1.87% to 2.51%, versus a range of 3.74% to 16.92% for the regressions using lagged forward 
interest rate differentials in Table 6, Panel A. The predictive power is similar to the predictive power 
when using the current spot interest rate differential alone (see Table 1, Panel C and Table 2). These 
results confirm the validity of the exchange rate model developed above in Section III. The innovation in 
current forward interest rates relative to lagged rates reduces their power to explain exchange rate 
changes.  
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Next we turn to the bivariate regression using the deviation of the exchange rate from PPP. This 
deviation is unobservable, but we can construct a variable that captures the same information, up to a 
constant. Specifically, consider the log real exchange rate 
)( * tttt zzsq  ,     (24) 
where q and s are the log real and nominal exchange rates, respectively, and z and z* denote the log price 
levels in the domestic and foreign country, respectively. Under PPP, the real exchange rate is constant, 
thus, the observed real exchange rate equals the deviation of this exchange rate from this PPP implied 
level, up to an unknown constant. In the context of a regression analysis, this unknown constant will 
appear in the intercept. 
 Table 8, Panel A presents summary statistics for the log real exchange rate series for the two 
currency pairs. The means are essentially meaningless in that they reflect the normalization of the price 
level series in the two countries. It is not surprising that the two series are very persistent given the 
persistence of the exchange rate series, and the relatively strong positive correlation between the two 
series is also expected. 
 We estimate regressions of annual exchange rate changes (overlapping monthly) on the log real 
exchange rate and the interest rate differential at the beginning of the year (and special cases thereof): 
1,
*
1,1,211, )( tttttt iiqs    .     (25) 
The results are reported in Table 8, Panel B. For ease of comparison, the top line for each exchange rate 
reports the standard UIP regressions, which are also reported in Tables 1 and 2. The second line reports 
the regression with the log real exchange rate, and the final line reports the results from the full 
specification.  
 This specification in equation (25) is essentially the same as that estimated in Jorda and Taylor 
(2009). They motivate the real exchange rate variable as the deviation from the fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate, although they do not provide a motivating model since they are primarily interested in 
forecasting and the associated trading strategies. They estimate various models using monthly data across 
multiple exchange rates for the period 1986-2008 and report results consistent with ours. 
 The first notable result is that, both alone and in the full specification, the log real exchange rate 
appears with a negative and statistically significant coefficient. This negative coefficient is consistent with 
the intuition from the model. When the real exchange rate is high, i.e., the dollar has appreciated less or 
depreciated more than would be suggested by the relative inflation rates in the two countries, then this 
effect is expected to reverse in the coming year. Moreover, this reversion to PPP, or expected currency 
crash, explains a significant fraction of the variation in exchange rate changes on its own, with R2s of 
18.8% and 17.5% for the USD/GBP and USD/DEM, respectively. 
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 The second notable result is that including the interest rate differential increases both the 
magnitude of the coefficient on this variable, relative to the case when it is used on its own, and the 
explanatory power of the regression. For example, the coefficient for the USD/DEM goes from -0.72 in 
the standard UIP regression to -1.70 in the augmented regression, and the corresponding R2 increases to 
29.4% (from 1.8% in the UIP regression and 17.5% in the real exchange rate regression). Clearly, 
controlling for both the crash effect and the carry trade effect together enhances our ability to identify 
both effects and increases the explanatory power for exchange rates, consistent with our model. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The forward premium puzzle is one of the more robust and widely studied phenomena in financial 
economics. Our paper makes three important contributions to this large literature.  
First, we document that recasting the UIP regression in terms of forward interest rate differentials 
rather than spot interest rate differentials deepens the puzzle. Specifically, the coefficients in these 
regressions are positive in contrast to the negative coefficients in the standard UIP specification, and the 
R2s are generally increasing in the horizon. 
Second, we present a model that can both explain the existing evidence and reconcile it with our 
new evidence. The key insight of the model is that exchange rate changes reflect two distinct but related 
phenomena. A carry trade effect associated with real rate distortions pushes exchange rates in the opposite 
direction to that predicted by a standard model of PPP. However, exchange rates probabilistically crash 
back to their fundamental levels. Forward interest rate differentials at different horizons pick up both of 
these conflicting effects to different degrees, yielding horizon-dependent coefficients and R2s. 
Finally, we show that within the model it is possible to decompose these two effects, either using 
forward rate differentials and shocks to these differentials, or interest rate differentials and real exchange 
rates. The data are consistent with these theoretical decompositions and provided further support for our 
model of exchange rate determination. 
While we present the simplest model that is broadly consistent with the empirical evidence, the 
model can be generalized across a number of dimensions. For example, we could add a real side to the 
economy, we could make the Taylor rule more complex, we could incorporate violations of the 
expectations hypothesis of interest rates, and we could postulate different dynamics for reversion to PPP. 
All of these adaptations could also be asymmetric, i.e., they could look different in the two countries. We 
believe that models along these lines could potentially explain much of the richness in the data. 
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Appendix A: Monte Carlo Exercise 
For the Monte Carlo exercise we simulate monthly exchange rates and spot and forward interest rate 
differentials, and then aggregate them to an annual frequency, in order to generate monthly overlapping 
annual data consistent with the empirical analysis. Thus, throughout this appendix, periods are measured 
in months (in contrast to the rest of the paper where all periods are measured in years). 
For the first experiment, we assume that the expectations hypotheses of exchange rates and 
interest rates hold at a monthly frequency, and that the longest maturity forward rate differential (the 
forward rate from month 59 to month 60) follows an AR(1) process: 
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We impose the following structure on the covariance matrix of the shocks: 
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Specifically, we impose that the variance of the shocks to forward interest rate differentials decline in 
maturity and that the correlations between the shocks to forward interest rate differentials decline in the 
difference between the maturities, at fixed rates determined by the parameters i  and ij , respectively. 
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We also impose zero correlation between the shock to exchange rate changes and the shocks to forward 
interest rate differentials. In the data, these correlations are relatively small and negative. However, these 
negative correlations are another manifestation of the violations of UIP that result in negative coefficients 
in the forward premium regressions in Tables 1 and 2. Therefore, we set the correlations to zero for the 
purposes of the Monte Carlo analyses.  
We calibrate the parameters of the model in order to match approximately the covariance matrix 
of the annual exchange rate changes and the annual spot and forward interest rate differentials, and the 
autocorrelation of the 4- to 5-year forward interest rate differentials. Obviously, these values differ 
somewhat across the two exchange rates we employ in the empirical analysis, so we target intermediate 
values. The inferences drawn from the Monte Carlo analysis are not sensitive to the precise choice of the 
parameters.  
Define the state vector 
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Equations (26)-(27) imply that ),0(~1  MVNyt , where  is a function of  and . The simulation 
procedure is as follows: 
 
1. Draw starting values yt from the distribution ),0(~ MVNyt . 
2. Draw an error vector t+1 from the distribution ),0(~1  MVNt . 
3. Compute yt+1 using this error vector and the lagged state vector via equation (26). 
4. Return to step 2 above. 
 
We generate 100,000 simulations of 428 monthly observations. We aggregate these 428 monthly 
data to an annual frequency and construct simulated samples with the appropriate lag structure of annual, 
monthly overlapping data of 357 observations each, the length of our sample. For each sample, we 
estimate the forward premium regressions in equation (6) and compute various test statistics. We also 
estimate the long-horizon versions of the forward premium regression in equation (2), after Chinn and 
Meredith (2005).  
28 
 
We also conduct a second Monte Carlo exercise, which is identical to the first except that we 
assume that exchange rates follow a random walk: 
s
tttts 1,1,     .      (30) 
Finally, we repeat the analyses above, relaxing the restriction that the shocks to exchange rate changes are 
normally distributed in order to incorporate the possible effects of fat tails in the relevant distribution. 
Instead, we resample with replacement actual monthly exchange rate changes from either the USD/GBP 
or USD/DEM series. To preserve the excess kurtosis, but to eliminate any sample-specific mean or 
skewness effects, we augment the two series with an equal number of observations that correspond to the 
negative of the observed exchange rate changes.  
Selected results appear in Tables 2 and 3, and they are discussed in Section II.C.  
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Appendix B: Proofs of Regression Coefficients 
A. Uncovered Interest Rate Parity 
The process for exchange rates is 
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where W~  is the number of periods since the last crash. Rewrite the exchange rate change in terms of 
inflation differentials: 
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and consider the UIP regression with independent variable is ))(( * ,1,1
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To compute this second term, note that (i) the inflation differentials are mean zero, so the covariance is 
just the expectation of the product, (ii) the dummy variable and the inflation differentials are independent 
of each other, and (iii) the covariance between inflation differentials at different points in time is 
  2* ,1,1* ,1,1* ,1,1* ,1,1 ))((),cov(  djjtjtjtjtttttjtjtjtjttttt E   . 
Therefore, the second term above is 
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Putting it all back together 
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B. Uncovered Interest Rate Parity with Forward Interest Rate Differentials 
Consider the regression on lagged forward interest rate differentials: 
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The dependent variable is the same as above. Under the expectations hypothesis of interest rates, the 
independent variable is 
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The regression coefficient is 
31 
 
 

  


 



 














)()(,)(cov
))(1(
)()(,
)())(1(cov),cov(
)()var(
)var(
),cov(
*
1,21,2
~
1
*
2,12,11
23
*
1,21,2
~
1
*
2,12,11
*
1,1,
*2,1
1
2,1
11,
222*2,1
1
2,1
1
*2,1
1
2,1
1
*2,1
1
2,1
11,
1
tttt
W
v
vtvtvtvtt
d
tttt
W
v
vtvtvtvtttttttttt
dtt
tt
tttt
D
Dififs
ifif
ifif
ififs








 
The second term is 
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The finite sum is different from the UIP regression above because the first inflation differential starts 
from t+1 whereas the second inflation differential is at t-1, so there are 2 terms that lead the second 
differential. Splitting the sum, 
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and putting it all back together: 
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Note that the term in large round brackets in the adjustment term is the same as the term in square 
brackets in the adjustment term in the UIP regression. 
 
C. Exchange Rate Determination with Expected and Unexpected Interest Rate Differentials  
Consider the regression: 
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The dependent variable is the same as above. The second independent variable is the same as above for 
the regression based on forward rate differentials. The first independent variable, under the expectations 
hypothesis of interest rates, is 
))(()()())(()()( * ,1,1
*
1,21,2
*
,1,1
*2,1
1
2,1
1
*
1,1, tttttttttttttttt ififii    . 
The independent variables are uncorrelated, thus 11   , and the other coefficient is the coefficient from 
a univariate regression 
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By construction, the shocks to the inflation process are uncorrelated with contemporaneous or lagged 
inflation, i.e., the only terms that matter are inflation differentials at t+1 and t. The second term is 
therefore
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Putting it all back together, 
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Table 1: Preliminaries 
 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics – Exchange Rates 
Exchange 
Rate 
Mean 
(%) 
SD 
(%) 
1st Order 
Autocorr. 
12th Order 
Autocorr. 
Correlations 
 
USD/GBP  -1.32 11.59 0.93 -0.02 1.00 0.72 
USD/DEM  0.79 12.78 0.93 0.10 0.72 1.00 
 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics – Forward Rate Differentials 
1,*1,   jjjj ifif   j 
Mean 
(%) 
SD 
(%) 
1st Order 
Autocorr. 
12th Order 
Autocorr. 
US-UK 0 -1.73 1.99 0.95 0.51 
1 -1.05 1.21 0.89 0.40 
2 -1.08 1.29 0.91 0.51 
3 -0.93 1.35 0.88 0.52 
4 -0.97 1.52 0.91 0.60 
US-Germ. 0 1.14 2.38 0.98 0.74 
1 1.40 1.82 0.97 0.72 
2 1.58 1.52 0.96 0.71 
3 1.57 1.46 0.96 0.71 
4 1.48 1.52 0.97 0.73 
 
 
Panel C: The Forward Premium Puzzle – 1-Year Horizon 
Exchange Rate  Std. Err.  Std. Err. R2 
USD/GBP -2.74 2.02 -0.82 0.88 2.00 
USD/DEM 1.61 1.88 -0.72 0.72 1.81 
 
 
Panels A and B report summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, first-order autocorrelation, twelfth-order 
autocorrelation, and cross correlations) for annual changes in log exchange rates and 1-year forward interest rate 
differentials at various horizons, sampled monthly. Panel C reports coefficient estimates, corresponding standard 
errors (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted using the Newey and West (1987) method), and R2s from the 
forward premium regression at the 1-year horizon 
.)( 1,
*
1,1,1, ttttt iis     
Exchange rate data cover 1/1980–9/2010 and interest rate data cover 1/1980–9/2009, 1/1979–9/2008, 1/1978–
9/2007, 1/1977–9/2006, and 1/1976–9/2005 for horizons j=0,…,4, respectively, for a total of 357 monthly 
observations in all cases. See Section II for a detailed description of the data. 
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Table 2: The Expectations Hypothesis of Exchange Rates 
 
 
Panel A: Regression Results 
Exchange Rate j  Std. Err.  Std. Err. SD P-value R2 
USD/GBP 0 -2.74 2.02 -0.82 0.88 0.93 5.56 2.00
1 -0.31 2.39 0.96 1.31 1.04 96.63 1.00
2 2.34 2.16 3.37 1.01 1.18 4.95 14.10
3 0.49 1.80 1.95 1.02 1.39 47.85 5.17
4 1.18 1.95 2.56 0.88 1.76 36.95 11.21
USD/DEM 0 1.61 1.88 -0.72 0.72 1.00 8.44 1.81
1 -0.12 1.96 0.65 1.21 1.11 73.48 0.85
2 -0.28 2.17 0.68 1.30 1.26 78.61 0.65
3 -2.38 2.37 2.01 1.39 1.48 47.84 5.32
4 -3.91 2.37 3.17 1.33 1.87 24.22 14.19
 
 
Panel B: Hypothesis Tests 
Exchange 
Rate 
 
j 
 
 
 
Std. Err. 
Deg. of 
Freedom 
LM 
Stat. 
 
P-value 
Wald 
Stat. 
 
P-value 
Both 0 =1  2 6.24 0.04 6.94 0.03 
Both 1 =1  2 0.10 0.95 0.10 0.95 
Both 2 =1  2 3.17 0.20 6.27 0.04 
Both 3 =1  2 1.14 0.57 1.30 0.52 
Both 4 =1  2 3.12 0.21 4.17 0.12 
Both 0 -0.75 0.67 1 0.01 0.90 0.01 0.90 
Both 1 0.78 1.08 1 0.06 0.81 0.06 0.81 
Both 2 2.29 0.95 1 2.56 0.11 3.56 0.06 
Both 3 1.97 0.85 1 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.97 
Both 4 2.67 0.83 1 0.22 0.64 0.23 0.63 
USD/GBP 1234 =1  4 4.58 0.33 8.48 0.08 
USD/DEM 1234 =1  4 4.07 0.40 4.82 0.31 
Both 1234 =1  8 7.47 0.49 17.46 0.03 
USD/GBP 1234 0.24 0.70 3 4.62 0.20 6.77 0.08 
USD/DEM 1234 0.96 1.30 3 3.98 0.26 4.47 0.21 
Both 1234 0.64 0.55 7 7.22 0.41 17.46 0.01 
 
 
Panel A reports coefficient estimates, corresponding standard errors (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted 
using the Newey and West (1987) method) and R2s from the forward premium regression (see Section II.B) 
,)( 1,
*1,1,
1, 



  jjtjj jtjj jttt ififs   
using annual data sampled monthly. All regressions are run using exchange rate data over 1/1980–9/2010 (see 
Section II for a detailed description of the data). The columns labeled “SD” and “P-value” report simulated cross-
sectional standard deviations of the estimated coefficient and two-sided P-values for the test  =1, respectively, 
under the Monte Carlo scheme described in Appendix A. Panel B reports tests of the hypotheses that  =1 and that 
the s are equal for various combinations of exchange rates and horizons. The Lagrange Multiplier test statistics 
(LM Stat.) impose the relevant restrictions and the Wald test statistics (Wald Stat.) are based on the unrestricted 
parameter estimates. We report the restricted parameter estimate and associated standard error where relevant. 
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Table 3: Monte Carlo Results 
 
Panel A: j = 1 
 Forward Interest Rates Long Horizon 
j True R2 Mean R2 SD R2 True R2 Mean R2 SD R2 
0 4.12 6.86 7.44 4.12 6.86 7.44 
1 3.24 5.92 6.80 6.79 11.28 11.73 
2 2.42 5.10 6.15 8.32 13.97 14.21 
3 1.64 4.32 5.43 8.96 15.31 15.46 
4 0.91 3.51 4.60 8.88 15.59 15.90 
 
 Correlation of  
 Forward Interest Rates Long Horizon 
j 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
0 0.86 0.68 0.52 0.36 0.94 0.86 0.77 0.68 
1  0.85 0.65 0.45  0.96 0.89 0.80 
2   0.83 0.57   0.97 0.89 
3    0.77    0.97 
 
Panel B: j = 0 
 Forward Interest Rates Long Horizon 
j True R2 Mean R2 SD R2 True R2 Mean R2 SD R2 
0 0.00 3.10 4.16 0.00 3.10 4.16 
1 0.00 3.09 4.13 0.00 5.68 7.27 
2 0.00 3.05 4.06 0.00 7.70 9.46 
3 0.00 2.97 3.96 0.00 9.10 10.87 
4 0.00 2.79 3.73 0.00 9.99 11.71 
 
 Correlation of  
 Forward Interest Rates Long Horizon 
j 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
0 0.86 0.69 0.53 0.37 0.95 0.86 0.78 0.70 
1  0.85 0.64 0.45  0.96 0.89 0.80 
2   0.82 0.56   0.97 0.90 
3    0.76    0.97 
 
Panel C: Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis  LM Test Wald Test 
j = 1 Level (%) 10.00 5.00 1.00 10.00 5.00 1.00 
 Rejection (%) 13.27 4.62 0.18 38.02 28.02 14.20 
j equal  Level (%) 10.00 5.00 1.00 10.00 5.00 1.00 
 Rejection (%) 12.22 4.43 0.23 26.05 16.75 6.35 
 
 
Table 3 reports the results from a Monte Carlo simulation in which we generate 100,000 replications of 428 monthly observations 
from a model that imposes the expectations hypothesis of interest rates and either the expectations hypothesis of exchange rates, 
j = 1, or a random walk in exchange rates,  j = 0. These observations are then aggregated to construct samples of 357 annual, 
monthly overlapping observations. (See Appendix A for a detailed description and Richardson and Smith (1989) for an analysis 
of the benefits of using overlapping observations.) Panels A and B report statistics on the coefficient estimates and R2s from the 
forward premium regressions (see Section II.B) 
,)( 1,
*1,1,
1, 



  jjtjj jtjj jttt ififs   
and the long-horizon regressions, after Chinn and Meredith (2005), 
jtjtjtjtt iis ,
*
,,1, )(    . 
 “True” refers to the analytical (infinite sample) value, and “Mean” and “SD” refer to the mean and standard deviation of the 
values across the simulations. For the test statistics, Panel C reports the percent of the simulations that reject the null hypothesis 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels under j = 1.   
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Table 4: Simulation Results from Exchange Rate Model  with Constant Crash Probability 
 
 
   R-squared (%) 
γ δ β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 0 1 2 3 4 
0.0 0 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 64.11 41.3 26.57 17.34 11.33
0.0 -5 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 64.11 41.3 26.57 17.34 11.33
0.0 -10 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 64.11 41.3 26.57 17.34 11.33
0.0 -15 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 64.11 41.3 26.57 17.34 11.33
0.0 -20 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 64.11 41.3 26.57 17.34 11.33
0.3 0 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.75 64.11 41.3 26.57 17.34 11.33
0.3 -5 0.06 0.21 0.39 0.61 0.80 0.03 0.22 0.50 0.77 0.86
0.3 -10 -0.60 -0.31 0.05 0.48 0.86 0.71 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.24
0.3 -15 -1.27 -0.83 -0.29 0.35 0.92 1.37 0.38 0.03 0.03 0.12
0.3 -20 -1.94 -1.35 -0.63 0.21 0.98 1.77 0.55 0.08 0.01 0.08
0.5 0 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 64.11 41.3 26.57 17.34 11.33
0.5 -5 -0.32 -0.12 0.14 0.44 0.71 0.41 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.33
0.5 -10 -1.26 -0.85 -0.34 0.26 0.79 1.52 0.44 0.05 0.02 0.10
0.5 -15 -2.20 -1.59 -0.82 0.07 0.87 2.04 0.68 0.12 0.00 0.05
0.5 -20 -3.14 -2.32 -1.30 -0.12 0.96 2.32 0.81 0.16 0.00 0.04
0.7 0 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 64.11 41.3 26.57 17.34 11.33
0.7 -5 -0.61 -0.36 -0.05 0.32 0.65 0.96 0.21 0.00 0.07 0.18
0.7 -10 -1.75 -1.25 -0.63 0.09 0.74 1.96 0.64 0.10 0.00 0.06
0.7 -15 -2.89 -2.14 -1.21 -0.13 0.84 2.36 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.03
0.7 -20 -4.03 -3.03 -1.80 -0.36 0.94 2.57 0.93 0.21 0.01 0.02
 
 
Table 4 presents regression results from the simulated exchange rate model described in equations (7)-(11). Results 
are based on a single simulation of 100,000 observations with an inflation persistence parameter θ = 0.8 and a 
constant crash probability of 7% per period. Columns 3-7 and 8-12 present coefficients and R2s, respectively, from 
the forward premium regression (see Section II.B) 
,)( 1,
*1,1,
1, 



  jjtjj jtjj jttt ififs   
for horizons up to 4 years.  
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Table 5: Simulation Results from Exchange Rate Model with Time-Varying Crash Probability 
 
 
Panel A: Forward Premium Regressions 
     R-squared (%) 
γ δ θ p  β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 0 1 2 3 4 
0.5 -10 0.80 7% -0.41 0.27 1.03 1.82 2.61 0.21 0.06 0.53 1.06 1.41
0.4 -10 0.80 7% -0.22 0.37 1.02 1.71 2.40 0.08 0.14 0.70 1.26 1.59
0.6 -10 0.80 7% -0.57 0.19 1.03 1.90 2.79 0.32 0.02 0.42 0.94 1.28
0.5 -8 0.80 7% -0.21 0.34 0.94 1.58 2.21 0.08 0.14 0.70 1.26 1.59
0.5 -12 0.80 7% -0.62 0.21 1.10 2.05 3.00 0.32 0.02 0.42 0.94 1.28
0.5 -10 0.75 7% -0.53 0.28 1.24 2.33 3.47 0.36 0.06 0.63 1.24 1.55
0.5 -10 0.85 7% -0.27 0.29 0.85 1.40 1.90 0.08 0.07 0.44 0.86 1.14
0.5 -10 0.80 6% -0.61 0.06 0.82 1.59 2.37 0.42 0.00 0.31 0.76 1.07
0.5 -10 0.80 8% -0.27 0.46 1.22 1.96 2.74 0.10 0.18 0.81 1.34 1.67
 
 
Panel B: Bivariate Augmented Forward Premium Regressions 
            R-squared (%)
γ δ θ p  1,0  2,0  3,0 4,0 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
0.5 -10 0.80 7% -1.63 -1.42 -1.21 -1.04 0.28 1.03 1.83 2.63 1.23 1.98 2.39 2.50
0.4 -10 0.80 7% -1.28 -1.10 -0.92 -0.76 0.37 1.03 1.72 2.41 1.12 1.87 2.28 2.39
0.6 -10 0.80 7% -1.94 -1.69 -1.46 -1.27 0.19 1.03 1.91 2.81 1.35 2.08 2.48 2.59
0.5 -8 0.80 7% -1.18 -1.01 -0.85 -0.71 0.34 0.95 1.58 2.23 1.12 1.87 2.28 2.39
0.5 -12 0.80 7% -2.09 -1.82 -1.58 -1.36 0.21 1.11 2.06 3.02 1.35 2.08 2.48 2.59
0.5 -10 0.75 7% -1.58 -1.36 -1.16 -0.99 0.28 1.25 2.34 3.49 1.45 2.25 2.64 2.67
0.5 -10 0.85 7% -1.74 -1.51 -1.30 -1.10 0.30 0.86 1.41 1.91 1.04 1.70 2.06 2.14
0.5 -10 0.80 6% -1.80 -1.61 -1.40 -1.22 0.06 0.82 1.60 2.39 1.33 2.03 2.39 2.47
0.5 -10 0.80 8% -1.57 -1.32 -1.07 -0.89 0.46 1.22 1.97 2.75 1.34 2.15 2.47 2.54
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Table 5 Cont’d 
 
 
Panel C: Bivariate Real Exchange Rate Regressions 
γ δ θ p 1 2 2R  
0.5 -10 0.80 7% -0.41 0.21
0.5 -10 0.80 7% -0.13 7.75
0.5 -10 0.80 7% -0.21 -2.67 13.73
0.4 -10 0.80 7% -0.21 -2.18 13.68
0.6 -10 0.80 7% -0.21 -3.09 13.77
0.5 -8 0.80 7% -0.21 -2.01 13.68
0.5 -12 0.80 7% -0.21 -3.32 13.77
0.5 -10 0.75 7% -0.20 -2.56 13.72
0.5 -10 0.85 7% -0.21 -2.78 13.49
0.5 -10 0.80 6% -0.17 -2.68 12.34
0.5 -10 0.80 8% -0.24 -2.66 15.12
 
 
Table 5 presents regression results from the simulated exchange rate model described in equations (7)-(10). Results 
are based on a single simulation of 100,000 observations with a time-varying crash probability given by equation 
(16), where the weight is set so that the average crash probability equals the value in column 4. The benchmark 
model is presented in the first row of each panel, and subsequent pairs of rows show deviations around this 
benchmark for a specific parameter, which is highlighted in bold. In Panel A, columns 5-9 and 10-14 present 
coefficients and R2s, respectively, from the forward premium regression (see Section II.B) 
,)( 1,
*1,1,
1, 



  jjtjj jtjj jttt ififs   
for horizons up to 4 years. In Panel B, columns 5-12 and 13-16 present coefficients and R2s, respectively, from the 
bivariate augmented forward premium regression model (see Section III.D) 
1
*1,1,*1,1,*
1,1,,01, )()]()[( 







  tjj jtjj jtjjj jtjj jtttjjtt uififififiis  , 
for horizons up to 4 years. In Panel C, columns 5-6 and 7 present coefficients and R2s, respectively, from the 
bivariate real exchange rate regression model 
1
*
1,1,211, )(   tttttt iiPPPDs  . 
  
44 
 
Table 6: Decomposing Interest Rate Differentials 
 
 
Panel A: Regression Results 
Exchange 
Rate 
 
j 
 
 
 
Std. err. 
 
j  
 
Std. err. 
 
j,0  
 
Std. err. 
 
R2 
USD/GBP 1 -1.63 2.42 0.40 1.39 -1.09 0.84 4.22
2 0.98 2.36 2.57 1.23 -0.76 0.69 15.83
3 -0.77 2.22 1.16 1.49 -0.66 0.88 6.43
4 0.47 2.05 2.10 1.26 -0.34 0.81 11.53
USD/DEM 1 -0.56 1.98 0.53 1.17 -2.28 0.94 9.41
2 -0.03 2.17 0.24 1.38 -1.01 0.67 3.74
3 -1.71 2.41 1.32 1.58 -0.96 0.72 8.42
4 -3.06 2.45 2.39 1.56 -0.89 0.81 16.92
 
 
Panel B: Hypothesis Tests for j  
Exchange 
Rate 
 
j 
 
j  
 
Std. Err. 
Deg. of 
Freedom 
LM 
Stat. 
 
P-value 
Wald 
Stat. 
 
P-value 
Both 1 =1  2 0.23 0.89 0.23 0.89
Both 2 =1  2 1.83 0.40 2.55 0.28
Both 3 =1  2 0.05 0.98 0.05 0.98
Both 4 =1  2 1.23 0.54 1.31 0.52
Both 1 0.49 1.10 1 0.01 0.92 0.01 0.92
Both 2 1.42 1.12 1 1.81 0.18 2.23 0.14
Both 3 1.24 1.14 1 0.01 0.94 0.01 0.94
Both 4 2.20 1.05 1 0.03 0.87 0.03 0.87
USD/GBP 1234 =1  4 4.76 0.31 8.37 0.08
USD/DEM 1234 =1  4 3.19 0.53 3.41 0.49
Both 1234 =1  8 6.77 0.56 16.46 0.04
USD/GBP 1234 0.99 1.17 3 4.76 0.19 7.83 0.05
USD/DEM 1234 3.02 1.17 3 3.30 0.35 3.40 0.33
Both 1234 0.54 0.72 7 6.76 0.45 16.46 0.02
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Table 6 Cont’d 
 
 
Panel C: Hypothesis Tests for j,0  
Exchange 
Rate 
 
j 
 
j,0  
 
Std. Err. 
Deg. of 
Freedom 
LM 
Stat. 
 
P-value 
Wald 
Stat. 
 
P-value 
Both 1 =1  2 7.94 0.02 12.41 0.00
Both 2 =1  2 8.37 0.02 9.96 0.01
Both 3 =1  2 6.81 0.03 7.50 0.02
Both 4 =1  2 6.28 0.04 5.56 0.06
Both 1 -1.52 0.81 1 2.44 0.12 2.45 0.12
Both 2 -0.90 0.60 1 0.16 0.69 0.16 0.69
Both 3 -0.88 0.70 1 0.18 0.67 0.17 0.68
Both 4 -0.63 0.72 1 0.55 0.46 0.54 0.46
USD/GBP 1234 =1  4 6.92 0.14 12.56 0.01
USD/DEM 1234 =1  4 10.58 0.03 13.95 0.01
Both 1234 =1  8 11.73 0.16 18.65 0.02
USD/GBP 1234 -0.98 0.64 3 3.51 0.32 4.54 0.21
USD/DEM 1234 -0.59 0.61 3 2.53 0.47 3.57 0.31
Both 1234 -0.95 0.57 7 7.20 0.41 10.39 0.17
 
 
Table 6 reports coefficient estimates, corresponding standard errors (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted 
using the Newey and West (1987) method) and R2s from the estimation of the augmented forward premium 
regression (see Section IV.B for details): 
1
*1,1,*1,1,*
1,1,,01, )()]()[( 







  tjj jtjj jtjjj jtjj jtttjjtt uififififiis  , 
using annual data sampled monthly. All regressions are run using exchange rate data over 1/1980–9/2010 (see 
Section II for a detailed description of the data). 
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Table 7: The Information in the 
Contemporaneous Forward Interest Rate Differentials 
 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
 
j 
 
 
 
Std. err. 
 
j  
 
Std. err. 
 
j,0  
 
Std. err. 
 
R2 
USD/GBP 1 -2.80 2.04 -0.61 1.32 -1.04 1.43 2.05
2 -2.60 2.09 -1.09 1.13 -0.43 1.33 2.18
3 -2.72 2.03 -0.91 1.08 -0.65 1.34 2.04
4 -2.73 2.00 -0.95 1.05 -0.50 1.38 2.13
USD/DEM 1 1.38 1.89 -1.07 1.91 -0.59 1.17 1.87
2 0.75 2.14 -1.32 1.26 -0.24 1.38 2.33
3 0.82 2.17 -1.10 0.98 -0.26 1.46 2.27
4 0.69 2.13 -1.09 0.89 -0.16 1.50 2.51
 
 
Table 7 reports coefficient estimates, corresponding standard errors (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted 
using the Newey and West (1987) method) and R2s from the estimation of the augmented forward premium 
regression with contemporaneous forward rate differentials (see Section IV for details): 
1
*1,1,*1,1,*
1,1,,01, )()]()[( 

  tjjtjjtjjjtjjtttjtt uififififiis  , 
using annual data sampled monthly. All regressions are run using exchange rate data over 1/1980–9/2010 (see 
Section II for a detailed description of the data). 
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Table 8: Real Exchange Rates and The Expectations Hypothesis of Exchange Rates 
 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Exchange 
Rate Mean SD 
1st Order 
Autocorr. 
12th Order 
Autocorr. Correlations 
USD/GBP  0.46 0.14 0.98 0.65 1.00 0.71 
USD/DEM  -0.46 0.16 0.98 0.70 0.71 1.00 
 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
Exchange 
Rate 
 
 
 
Std. err. 
 
1 
 
Std. err. 
 
2 
 
Std. err. 
 
R2 
USD/GBP -2.74 2.02 -0.82 0.88 2.00
14.95 6.21 -0.35 0.13  18.77
14.03 5.93 -0.38 0.12 -1.24 0.80 23.18
USD/DEM 1.61 1.88 -0.72 0.72 1.81
-14.29 5.18 -0.33 0.12  17.49
-16.31 4.93 -0.41 0.11 -1.70 0.54 26.37
 
 
Panel A reports summary statistics for log real exchange rates over the period 1/1980-9/2009. Panel B reports 
coefficient estimates, corresponding standard errors (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted using the 
Newey and West (1987) method) and R2s from the estimation of the augmented forward premium regression (see 
Section IV for details): 
1,
*
1,1,211, )( tttttt iiqs    , 
using annual data sampled monthly. All regressions are run using exchange rate data over 1/1980–9/2010 (see 
Section II for a detailed description of the data). 
 
